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 Summary
In recent years, government and civil society organisations have increasingly 
deployed digital tools in their efforts to increase the participation of citizens in 
various aspects of governance. The term ‘civic tech’ is often used to describe this 
at the city governance level; however, as this research also considers initiatives 
that aim to extend citizen participation in global, national and corporate 
governance, we use the term ‘citizen participation technologies’. Examples of 
such technologies include interactive government websites, open data portals, 
online participatory budgeting platforms and text and instant messaging tools. 
Much of the existing research on citizen participation technologies takes the 
technology as its starting point, focusing primarily on the identification and 
analysis of technical barriers to adoption and assessing opportunities for 
technical improvements. We argue that this techno-centric gaze obscures non-
use and the reasons why many citizens remain excluded. Instead, this research 
adopts a human-centric approach, selecting specific user groups as case studies 
rather than specific technologies, and identifying the contextual social norms 
and structural power relations that explain the use and non-use of citizen 
participation technologies. 
Qualitative data gathered from semi-structured interviews and focus groups 
are interpreted through the five A’s of technology access and the conceptual 
lens of the Power Cube, to ask: which forms of power, operating at which levels, 
and in which sorts of spaces, affect the use and non-use of citizen participation 
technologies?
Key themes in this paper
• Power and participation
• Digital technologies and ICT4D
• Civic tech
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Introduction
In recent years, there has been a global proliferation of 
digital governance initiatives that aim to enable citizens 
to make their city or local government more open, 
transparent and responsive. By digital governance, we 
mean the use of digital information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) to create or enhance the 
communication channels that facilitate the interaction 
between citizens, government and the private sector 
(Haikin 2016). This research is concerned with the 
use of citizen participation technologies in digital 
governance initiatives in the Philippines.
The term ‘civic tech’ is widely used to refer to the use 
of digital technologies to extend citizen participation 
in city governance. As this research includes a wider 
consideration of citizen participation – in village, 
national and corporate governance – we use the 
broader term ‘citizen participation technologies’. 
These include, but are not limited to, mobile 
applications (apps), websites, online portals, and SMS 
and instant messaging platforms. 
Their popularity in digital governance initiatives is 
based on the claim that they enable citizens to monitor, 
intervene and influence the governance processes 
that affect their lives, and to do this remotely. Citizen 
participation technologies have the potential to 
allow citizens to monitor government performance; 
to access government data; to make freedom of 
information requests; to report issues needing 
attention; to check representatives’ voting records; 
or to contribute to policy and budget discussions. 
Established examples of digital governance initiatives 
include IPaidABribe,1 FixMyStreet2 and BudgIT,3 which 
focus on corruption reporting, service deficiency 
reporting and budget transparency initiatives 
respectively; these were all created by citizens. 
This report forms part of the wider Making All Voices 
Count programme of research into the expanding 
citizen use of digital technologies to monitor and 
influence governments and corporations, as well as 
moves towards technology-mediated forms of more 
participatory governance. In pursuing this research, 
Making All Voices Count has focused on eight African 
and four Asian countries, funding over 100 projects 
and studies in which digital technologies are applied 
to promote transparency, fight corruption, empower 
citizens and harness the power of new technologies to 
make government more effective and accountable. 
The research covered in this paper reviews a selection 
of citizen participation technology initiatives in one 
of Making All Voices Count’s priority countries: 
the Philippines. The Philippines is a particularly 
appropriate place for research on citizen participation 
technologies, as it has a unique history of civic 
engagement in governance and is at the forefront of 
the uptake of many digital technologies. Once known 
as the ‘text messaging capital of the world’ (Text 
Engine nd), the Philippines more recently became the 
‘Facebook capital of the world’ (Chaffey 2017) and is 
currently the country with the fastest-growing number 
of Internet users in the world (Shadrach 2017). 
The role played by the Philippines’ ‘Generation Text’ 
was crucial in mobilising citizens to end the rule of 
President Joseph Estrada during the People’s Power 
II uprisings (Rafael 2003). When President Estrada 
was eventually overthrown, he famously blamed the 
‘text messaging generation’ for his demise. Filipinos 
are evidently adept at applying their advanced digital 
capabilities to address failings in governance, and 
they are currently using a wide range of innovative 
digital technology applications to increase their 
participation in governance. 
Our initial desk review suggested that, given the high 
levels of digital adoption and public engagement in 
governance issues, we might expect to find significant 
traction for citizen participation technologies in the 
Philippines. However, our literature review suggested 
that existing research was often techno-centric, asking 
users why they use a certain technology and how it can 
be technically improved. This is, of course, a valid and 
illuminating line of research, which we in no way seek to 
devalue, but it leads to a focus on the technical barriers 
to adoption – at the expense of the social and political 
barriers. To address this gap and shift the focus 
away from the technology, we avoided the common 
practice of focusing our case studies around specific 
technologies. Instead, we identified three opportunities 
to engage with case studies of citizen groups engaging 
in governance issues in the areas of: (1) participatory 
budgeting; (2) participatory school management; and 
(3) popular oversight of extractive industries. 
The research was conducted over six months in 2017, 
and involved desk-based research in the UK as well as 
field research in Manila, the capital of the Philippines, 
and in Palawan province. 
1 See: www.ipaidabribe.com
2 See: www.fixmystreet.com
3 See: http://yourbudgit.com
RESEARCH 
REPORT
The techno-centric gaze: incorporating citizen participation technologies 
into participatory governance processes in the Philippines
1.1 Research objectives
The overall objective of studying citizen participation 
technologies was to improve our understanding 
of the factors that contribute to citizen uptake of 
governance technologies, and the extent to which 
their use translates into increased government 
responsiveness to citizens’ priorities. 
This study was designed to pay particular attention 
to the factors that explain why some citizens do 
not use these technologies. We adopted this focus 
because we wanted to learn who is not participating, 
which factors contribute to their exclusion, and 
to foreground their voices and standpoints. This 
research intends to build out from the technical 
analysis of many previous studies, to provide a 
complementary consideration of the social and 
political factors that enable or constrain citizen 
uptake and government responsiveness. 
The knowledge gaps we aimed to address were the 
lack of:
• non-user perspectives in existing research
• case studies of citizen participation technologies in 
the Philippines
• a structured approach for conducting technology 
access analysis 
• structured power analysis in the existing literature 
on citizen participation technologies.
The rationale for our research, then, was to ‘zoom 
out’ from the common techno-centric focus and to 
make a ‘power-aware’ assessment of the social and 
political factors that explain the use and non-use of 
citizen participation technologies. The main research 
questions we sought to answer were: 
• Which forms of power, at which levels and in which 
spaces, explain the use and non-use of citizen 
participation technologies? 
• From this power-aware perspective, what 
deficiencies exist in existing theories of 
change around the use of citizen participation 
technologies?
• What lesson should guide future practice for digital 
governance initiatives, in the Philippines and other 
Making All Voices Count countries?
The lessons and findings from our research can be 
used to interrogate the underlying assumptions of 
citizen participation technology initiatives and inform 
future theories of change. This addresses a core 
Making All Voices Count priority – citizens’ use of 
technology to hold power-holders to account – and 
seeks to enhance the existing understanding of digital 
citizen participation processes in the Philippines.
2. Literature review and theoretical 
framework
Great hope has been invested in the idea that new 
digital technologies can provide solutions to global 
development challenges. From the one laptop per 
child project4 to 3D printers (Ramalingam, Hernandez, 
Prieto Martin and Faith 2016) and the blockchain 
(Hernandez 2017), expectations are repeatedly raised 
about the potential that digital technologies offer. The 
challenge of increasing government’s transparency 
and responsiveness to citizens’ needs has been no 
exception. Open data projects, freedom of information 
initiatives and interactive, online citizen-to-government 
platforms are common citizen participation 
technologies that seek to achieve these ambitions. 
The champions of these technologies see them as 
important new mechanisms for increasing government 
transparency, accountability and responsiveness. 
However, the early promise of applying technology 
for transparency and accountability has not been 
fully realised. It has been argued that this is partly 
due to a series of false assumptions in the theories 
of change that underlie many transparency and 
accountability initiatives (McGee and Gaventa 2011). 
Such assumptions may be conscious or unconscious 
and may be explicit or implicit. 
One such false assumption is that aggregating 
and communicating citizens’ demands via citizen 
participation technologies will result in increased 
government responsiveness. This assumption rests 
on others: that citizens have sufficient access, intent 
and agency to demand responsiveness; and that 
government has sufficient capacity and intent to 
respond. Based on such assumptions, the theory 
4 See: www.olpcnews.com/2006/08
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of change in many initiatives is that a correctly 
specified technology is a sufficient condition to 
increase government responsiveness to citizens’ 
demands. When such projects fail to produce 
government responsiveness, the techno-centric 
response is often limited to altering technical 
specifications. This techno-centric gaze fails to 
consider contextual social and political factors which 
may also be relevant.
2.1 The techno-centric gaze 
Citizen participation technologies often aim to 
provide citizens with a mechanism to shed light on 
government deficiencies and to ‘close the feedback 
loop’ (Gigler and Bailur 2014) in the belief that 
doing so will improve government service provision. 
However, the empirical evidence to support this 
hypothesis is weak (Fox 2007). Disappointed by 
the results of early initiatives, technology-led 
activists often respond by offering further technical 
modifications. Yet in most of the 23 technology 
for transparency and accountability initiatives 
analysed by Peixoto and Fox (2016), levels of 
government responsiveness were deemed to be low 
or non-existent.
The techno-centric gaze tends to perceive any 
social problem as a technical problem, amenable to 
a technical solution. This blinkered framing leads 
to the idea that pre-packaged, techno-centric 
solutions are the answer to global development 
challenges. This view is by no means restricted to 
citizen technologies for participatory governance, 
as has been extensively documented by scholars 
including Easterly (2006) Toyama (2015, 2010) 
and Ramalingam (2013). Yet transparency and 
accountability are, by definition, political to the 
extent that they aim to secure, for accountability 
seekers, information or action from accountability 
givers across a space of power differentials (McGee 
and Carlitz 2013). 
By avoiding the techno-centric gaze and adopting 
the standpoint of non-users, we were able to better 
understand the barriers to technology access, 
explaining non-use as well as the power relationships 
embedded in these non-actions. The remainder of 
this section presents the twin lenses of technology 
access and power analysis that we used to interpret 
the data. The power analysis was part of the original 
research design and arose from the literature review. 
However, it was the highly differentiated levels of 
technology access that we encountered during the 
fieldwork phase that led us to add an analysis of 
technology access.
2.2 Technology access analysis: 
the five A’s
There are 118 mobile phone subscriptions per 100 
citizens in the Philippines (ITU 2016). Many Filipinos 
buy subscriptions with more than one provider to 
cope with signal drop-outs and to benefit from special 
offers. Estimates of Internet-capable smartphone 
ownership in the Philippines range from 25–40% 
(IDC 2016). Only 3.4% of the population has fixed 
broadband Internet in their home, but more generally 
40% have some form of mobile internet, dial-up or 
broadband access (ITU 2016). 
Yet these figures disguise as much as they reveal. 
Such statistics imagine that connectivity is binary: 
that a citizen is either fully connected or not at all 
connected. In reality, the situation is much more 
complicated. A person may be double-counted as 
connected because they have two mobile phone 
numbers, but they still may not enjoy reliable access 
to either phone calls or mobile Internet for a number 
of reasons. For most Filipinos, their connectivity 
varies dramatically over time and space, as they 
move in and out of coverage – coverage that is 
likely to be intermittent and of variable quality – or 
as payday approaches or recedes, and their ability 
to keep their phone charged and loaded with credit 
varies. 
As we examined the factors at play in the Philippines, 
rather than think of connectivity as a binary 
function, we found it useful to assess connectivity 
using the five ‘A’s of technology access (Roberts 
2016): availability, affordability, awareness, ability 
and accessibility. Focusing our analysis on these 
five dimensions helps to ‘de-centre’ the actual 
technology and highlight the social and political 
factors that limit technology access. Figure 1 
illustrates these five dimensions.5
Figure 1 The five A’s of technology access 
Source: Roberts (2017)
5 This builds on Roberts (2010), Kleine (2008) and Tongia and Subrahmanian (2006). 
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Availability: to whom is the technology (un)available
Affordability: to whom is the technology (un)affordable
Awareness: who is (un)aware of the technology?
Ability: who (doesn’t) have the skills to make effective 
use of the technology?
Accessibility: in which language is the technology 
accessible? Can blind or visually impaired people use 
the technology?
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Availability
The Philippines comprises around 7,000 islands, 
many of which are not connected to the national 
power grid, to broadband Internet, or to any of the 
fixed or mobile telephone networks. For people living 
in these islands, the Internet is simply not available. 
This form of digital exclusion reflects pre-existing 
geographical and economic exclusions, but in a 
world where economic and social life is increasingly 
mediated online, this new form of exclusion can 
significantly amplify pre-existing ones. 
Government services or development initiatives that 
are only available via technology risk adding digital 
inequalities to existing disparities of income and 
education levels. For example, rural populations that 
are already excluded from many government health 
and education services are now excluded from new 
e-health and online education initiatives. Women 
are over-represented in rural communities, and 
are therefore disproportionately affected by non-
availability in these areas. 
People in rural areas are often accustomed to such 
fragile connectivities (de Lanerolle 2017), with 
mobile phone signals often weak and intermittent, 
and frequent power cuts further compromising 
connectivity. For these already marginalised 
communities, the advent of the information society 
can magnify existing exclusion in relation to affluent 
urban populations. For example, the Batak community 
that we visited in Palawan had no grid electricity, no 
Internet connection and no cellular mobile coverage 
– but they could get a mobile phone signal at the 
nearest highway, although this required a long walk 
across 11 bridges. This highlights how availability is 
not binary: a person may have no connection at home, 
but be connected elsewhere. Often this will be at their 
workplace or in a public library. 
Affordability
Within the section of the population for whom 
Internet coverage is available, there is a smaller 
group for whom it is not affordable. The Philippines 
has the most expensive (and lowest quality) Internet 
in Southeast Asia when measured as a percentage 
of gross national income (ITU 2016), with a duopoly 
of providers blamed for artificially high prices and 
low incentive to improve the quality of service. These 
high costs mean that Internet connectivity is out of 
reach for many Filipinos on low incomes. Nationwide, 
40% of citizens live below the poverty line; this rises 
to 60% in outlying provinces such as Palawan, and 
higher still in historically marginalised communities 
such as the Batak indigenous people. 
Affordability is not a binary issue, however. A person 
may purchase a bundle of phone credit or data 
connectivity on pay day, for example, but this must 
be used frugally to make it last (de Lanerolle 2017). 
In the Philippines, frugal practices include avoiding 
unlimited text bundles in preference to WhatsApp 
instant messaging data; owning multiple SIM6 cards 
to switch between free services at different times of 
the day and week; and keeping phones charged to 
receive incoming calls, but not making any outgoing 
voice calls. A person employing frugal practices to 
make their credit last may feel unable to use citizen 
participation technologies for reasons of affordability.
Awareness
For those to whom the Internet is both available and 
affordable, a lack of awareness often contributes 
to levels of non-use of certain technologies. A 
large number of citizen participation technologies 
have been launched in the Philippines, but levels 
of public awareness about them are not very high. 
Here, awareness relates to knowing that an initiative 
exists, and knowing if it has relevance to a person’s 
life priorities. It is common for digital development 
project teams to lack expertise in marketing or 
awareness-raising, and for project budgets to omit 
the necessary resources to scale engagement by 
building project awareness. Awareness-raising must 
enable a person to judge for themselves whether 
the investment of time and money required will 
produce outcomes that they value. Like affordability, 
awareness is not a binary issue but something that 
can have various levels, and which has to be built 
progressively over time, perhaps through a range of 
mechanisms.
Ability
Even if awareness levels are high, a person’s ability 
to make effective use (Gurstein 2003) of available 
technology can be limited by a lack of digital literacy, 
skills or knowledge. Inadequate provision of digital 
literacy training is a common feature of many 
technology for development programmes. It is often 
easier to secure funding for early-stage technical 
prototyping and pilots than for user training and 
awareness-raising. Citizen participation innovators are 
themselves often urban, middle class and university 
educated, and the levels of digital literacy they project 
onto their imagined users are often inaccurate. 
To avoid further disadvantaging those already 
marginalised by low levels of education and 
technology access, digital development initiatives 
need to invest in building these abilities alongside 
technical platforms. As gender norms often lead 
6 Subscriber identity module, which is intended to securely store the international mobile subscriber identity number of a mobile phone.
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to the under-representation of women and girls in 
science, technology, engineering and mathematics, 
particular attention needs to be paid to enhancing the 
appropriate abilities in gender-aware programming. 
Accessibility
If we design technologies that are inaccessible to 
people with disabilities – people who are blind or 
visually impaired, for example – or technologies 
that only operate in a country’s main language, we 
risk excluding these groups and adding another 
layer of disadvantage to their marginalisation. Yet 
citizen participation technologies are sometimes 
built without taking into consideration the needs of 
everyone, for example indigenous language speakers 
or people living with disabilities. Accessibility-aware 
design means ensuring that digital interfaces are 
available in local languages, use culturally appropriate 
images and content, and are easy to use by those with 
low print literacy. 
In the Philippines, disability statistics have not been 
fully established (Buenaobra 2011), but in line with 
other countries, over 10% of the population are living 
with a disability. Only 2% of disabled Filipinos attend 
school and only 1% are properly diagnosed (Ibid.). 
Disabled people are disproportionately unemployed 
and therefore living on relatively low incomes, making 
them among the most marginalised in society. 
Analysis using the five A’s
These five A’s of technology access can be used 
positively to consciously include marginalised groups 
whenever digital technologies are designed and 
deployed. Designing digital initiatives that accurately 
meet existing needs requires a close initial analysis 
of local levels of technology access, but achieving 
this can form a solid basis for positive engagement 
with marginalised communities to enhance their 
participation in governance. There is reason to 
believe that technology design based on an accurate 
assessment of local realities is more likely to lead to 
successful citizen participation initiatives. 
It is important to remember that none of these 
categories is binary, and that each encapsulates a 
range of different experiences – a different quality of 
connection and different degrees of access. Analysing 
technology access in this way highlights that the 
binary idea of ‘fully connected’ or ‘fully disconnected’ 
citizens – as conveyed by national statistics – is far 
from the more complex and nuanced reality on the 
ground. 
Using the five A’s method of analysing access is 
one way of thinking through exactly who initiatives 
are intended to benefit and which blend of digital 
technologies and analogue complements are 
necessary to achieve objectives. Such analysis also 
invites the question of which factors are structuring 
these different levels of technology access. For 
this reason, we also include power analysis in our 
conceptual framework. 
2.3 Power analysis: the Power 
Cube
Although the literature on citizen participation 
technologies acknowledges the importance of power 
relations, there has been relatively little systematic 
power analysis to date. This is surprising, given 
the wealth of tools that exist for this purpose. Our  
research contributes to addressing this gap by 
applying Gaventa’s (2005) Power Cube to analyse 
the various dimensions of power that enable and limit 
citizen participation technologies, as shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 The Power Cube
Source: Gaventa (2006)
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Designing digital initiatives that accurately meet existing needs requires 
a close initial analysis of local levels of technology access, but achieving 
this can form a solid basis for positive engagement with marginalised 
communities to enhance their participation in governance.
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The Power Cube provides a means of analysing 
the different spaces, levels and forms of power 
that are in play when change processes are 
attempted (Pantazidou 2012). Closed spaces refer 
to decision-making that takes place behind closed 
doors by unaccountable individuals using unknown 
procedures. Making closed spaces and procedures 
open to public scrutiny has been a core focus of 
transparency and accountability activists. Some 
citizen participation technologies are designed 
and implemented by governments to create invited 
spaces, into which citizens are encouraged to 
access information, input data and participate in 
aspects of governance. Other citizen participation 
technologies are designed and implemented by 
civil society to create claimed (or created) spaces, 
from which they were previously excluded, in 
order to voice demands and expand the space of 
participatory governance. 
These ‘spaces’ of power may impact at various ‘levels’ 
or power. While the Power Cube shows three levels 
– global, national and local – it is important to take 
account of the multiple levels that are relevant within 
specific contexts, such as provincial or household.
The third dimension of the Power Cube is ‘forms’ 
of power. Visible power refers to exercising power 
over the setting and enforcing rules, procedures and 
institutional processes such as budget-setting and 
elections. Hidden power refers to the use of back-
room power over who gets a seat at the decision-
making table and what issues make it onto the 
agenda, as well as the use of intimidation, secretive 
lobbying, bribery or co-option to influence decision-
making. 
Invisible power refers to the use of power over 
channels of socialisation in order to control access 
to information and to favour the propagation of 
particular ideas, beliefs and values. This invisible 
internalised oppression is often described as the 
most insidious form of power. Ideas of sexism, 
racism or class / caste superiority and inferiority – 
learnt during socialisation – are often so pervasive 
that they come to be unconsciously internalised 
by oppressed groups, in ways that limit their sense 
of self-worth and self-efficacy or ‘power within’ 
(Rowlands 1997). This can manifest itself as a 
disinclination to join with others (power with) and 
take action to bring about change (power to). 
Citizen participation technologies are most often 
designed to address visible power, in the sense 
that they seek to include more citizens in formal 
consultations, monitoring and decision-making 
processes. We argue, though, that hidden and 
invisible power can explain low levels of uptake 
and the failure of some projects to meet their 
objectives. When assessing the low uptake of citizen 
participation technologies, we should not discount 
the possibility that invisible power could disincline 
some people from actively engaging if they have 
internalised images of themselves as having little 
of worth to voice, or believe the status quo to be 
impervious to change. 
Analysis of the extent to which these spaces and 
forms of power act as barriers to or stimulants 
of non-use and non-response is a gap in the 
research. Our research addresses this by reviewing 
and analysing citizen participation technologies 
in the Philippines using Gaventa’s Power Cube, in 
order to produce new knowledge about the use 
and non-use of citizen participation technologies. 
It will, therefore, contribute conceptually to our 
understanding of the theories of change related to 
citizen participation technologies.
Table 1 helps to clarify the concepts of visible, 
hidden and invisible power, and illustrates how these 
three dimensions of power are all forms of ‘power 
over’. It also illustrates how marginalised groups can 
respond to the exercise of ‘power over’ with tactics 
and strategies that build and deploy people’s sense 
of self-efficacy (power within), collective action 
(power with) and ability to influence and control 
(power to) (Rowlands 1997).
10
Citizen participation technologies are most often designed to 
address visible power, in the sense that they seek to include more 
citizens in formal consultations, monitoring and decision-making 
processes. We argue, though, that hidden and invisible power can 
explain low levels of uptake and the failure of some projects to 
meet their objectives. 
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Table 1 The Power Matrix
Mechanisms through which 
‘power over’ excludes and 
privileges 
Examples of injustice arising 
from ‘power over’
Responses and strategies to 
build countervailing power 
using ‘power within’, ‘power 
with’ and ‘power to’
Visible power
Formal institutions and officials: 
presidents, parliament, courts, 
International Monetary Fund, 
World Bank, corporations
Instruments: policies, laws, 
constitutions, budgets, 
regulations, conventions, written 
rules and processes
 
Laws or policies that do not 
address the needs of indigenous 
people, women or those on low 
incomes
When equality in law exists, but 
decision-making structures 
(including courts, committees, 
etc.) systematically favour the 
elite or powerful, and are closed 
to voices of excluded groups and 
minorities
 
Confronting, engaging, 
negotiating (power with + 
power to):
• lobbying and monitoring
• negotiation and litigation
• public education and media
• policy research, proposals
• marches and demos
• voting and running for office
• modelling alternatives
Hidden power 
Behind closed doors, decisions by 
dominant groups about who gets 
a seat at the table and what 
issues are allowed onto the 
agenda
Political control of (often 
unwritten) procedures to protect 
vested interests and exclude 
certain groups and delegitimise 
their issues
Use of intimidation, co-option 
and misinformation to defend the 
status quo
 
Leaders are undermined, labelled 
trouble-makers or 
unrepresentative
 
Issues are demeaned as elitist, 
impractical; not worthy of public 
action; and not economically 
viable
 
The media does not consider 
these groups’ issues to be 
mainstream or newsworthy
 
Crucial information is concealed 
or inaccessible
 
Building collective power 
(power with):
• building active constituencies 
around common concerns
• strengthening organisations, 
coalitions and movements
• demonstrating power through 
direct action
• participatory research and 
dissemination of information 
that legitimises the issues of 
the excluded
Invisible power 
Shaping what is considered to be 
normal by socialisation and 
media
Shaping of norms and values
Control of information, practices, 
cultural norms and customs to 
shape people’s own 
understanding of the limits on 
their place, role, rights and 
capabilities in ways that diminish 
their appetite to demand 
equitable treatment
 
Socialisation internalises feelings 
of powerlessness, inadequacy, 
apathy, etc.
Coupled with a lack of basic 
information, this restricts the 
ability to participate effectively 
and articulate demands
Gender, race and class are 
critical: oppressed people learn 
to blame themselves rather than 
structural injustice
 
Building individual and collective 
power (power within and power 
with):
• education for self-confidence 
using alternative media
• building self-efficacy, political 
awareness, and active 
citizenship
• developing a shared critique 
of injustice and speaking out 
together
• participatory action research 
and popular education and 
organising 
Source: adapted from VeneKlasen and Miller (2002)
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3. Methodology
To capture and foreground the knowledge and 
meaning-making of local (non-)users, we adopted 
a mix of qualitative methods that combined focus 
groups and semi-structured interviews. 
In Phase One, we conducted a desk-based literature 
review in the UK alongside a series of Skype 
consultations with Filipino experts from stakeholder 
organisations. This enabled us to generate insights 
into the key research questions and specific examples 
from which to construct the case studies.
Phase Two consisted of ten semi-structured interviews 
and five focus groups, conducted in Manila and 
Palawan province. Through these, we were able to 
bring together stakeholders to explore research 
questions in a collaborative dialogic process. 
After piloting our interview questions with Filipino 
experts and revising them accordingly, our research 
partners at G-Watch (Government Watch) convened 
a series of five focus groups comprising civil society 
representatives and grassroots organisations (n=66). 
The focus groups incorporated participatory exercises 
that enabled exploration of the research themes, 
and clustering and ranking of priority issues. These 
were complemented by a series of semi-structured 
interviews with key informants (n=10). 
Phase Three involved the coding and selective 
transcription of data collected during Phase Two 
activities, as well as further consultations with key 
informants. The write-up of the research findings 
took place in the UK, with drafts shared with research 
partners for verification purposes. 
This research design was developed in collaboration 
with the Making All Voices Count country research 
director in the Philippines, whose expertise in this 
field allowed us to benefit from the relationships that 
she has built up over many years.
3.1 Research ethics
This research was conducted in accordance with the 
research ethics policy of the Institute of Development 
Studies (IDS).7 This process included informing all 
research participants of the purposes of the study and 
potential uses of data, including making all findings 
and interpretation openly available. Voluntary informed 
consent was provided by all research participants. 
Given the principle of ‘avoiding doing harm’ and 
the local Philippines context in which violence is 
experienced by some civic activists, and paying 
attention to the sensitivity of some of the data collected, 
it was necessary to conceal the identities of research 
participants. This confidentiality and anonymity 
involved not only providing aliases for research 
participants quoted, but removing organisation names 
and other potentially identifying information. Research 
data was recorded without participants’ names and was 
never shared beyond the researchers.
3.2 Case studies
The Philippines was selected as a focus country 
in consultation with Making All Voices Count 
management due to its high concentration of citizen 
participation technology initiatives and the country’s 
history of applying digital technologies to governance 
issues. Given the wide range of technologies and the 
finite resources for this study, it was necessary to 
select a sample that would best enable us to answer 
the research questions. 
A purposeful sample was determined through a desk 
review of Making All Voices Count-funded projects 
and the wider field, drawing on the local expertise 
of Making All Voices Count’s research director in the 
Philippines. The desk review found that the existing 
literature was dominated by techno-centric research 
at the expense of person-centred approaches. To 
address this, we avoided constructing case studies 
centred around a specific technology (for example 
an Open Data platform or mobile phone application) 
and instead built three case studies around citizens 
and their prioritised concerns, including schools, local 
development projects and protecting their land from 
illegal mining. 
Case study 1: participatory budgeting 
We looked at two contrasting examples of 
participatory planning and budgeting technologies: 
Bottom-up Budgeting and Check My Barangay. 
Bottom-up Budgeting: Although the Philippines 
Constitution of 1987 and the Local Government 
Code of 1991 had promoted and required citizen 
participation in local governance, one interviewee 
told us that some government figures felt that 
progress towards participatory governance was too 
slow.8 In response, in 2012 the Aquino government 
7 See: www.ids.ac.uk/about-us/who-we-are/governance-and-funding/research-ethics
8 An alternative view from a research participant not in senior government was that institution-building in a post-authoritarian state 
takes time (after 21 years of rule by Marcos). From this person’s perspective, Bottom-up Budgeting should be less about speed and 
efficiency and more about the democratisation and representation of the under-represented in fiscal decision-making.
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implemented Bottom-up Budgeting to provide 
communities with some semblance of input into 
the budgetary decisions that affect their lives. It 
was adopted by the central government’s Human 
Development and Poverty Reduction cluster, and 
initially led by the National Anti-Poverty Commission, 
then later by the Department of Interior and Local 
Government. It was then piloted in 600 of the 
country’s poorest municipalities before scaling 
nationwide (Ateneo de Manila University 2013).
The process involves a transparency element in 
which government expenditure reports and budget 
projections are made available on the OpenBuB portal.9 
The process also involves a participation element in 
which accredited civil society organisations (CSOs) are 
invited to identify communities’ expenditure priorities. 
These are identified in meetings or online fora, through 
which communities select those projects that they 
judge as best responding to their articulated needs. 
CSOs then articulate these to government. 
Check My Barangay: While the government’s 
commitment to increasing transparency and 
citizen participation is evident in the OpenBuB 
portal, this only reaches down to the municipal 
level of government; it stops short of the village, or 
barangay,10 level. The Check My Barangay initiative 
created a space at the grass-roots level to enable 
citizens to play a direct and active role in the planning, 
monitoring and evaluation of public expenditure in 
their neighbourhood. 
Check My Barangay is a relatively small civil 
society-initiated pilot project, funded by Making All 
Voices Count. Developed by the non-governmental 
organisation (NGO) Affiliated Network for Social 
Accountability-East Asia Pacific (ANSA-EAP), the 
project combined a mobile app and website platform 
to enable citizens to design, promote and vote for 
local development projects online. Contrary to their 
expectations, ANSA-EAP found that the technology 
aspect of the project was unsuccessful due to low 
levels of smartphone and data connectivity among 
their target users. Instead, they had to rely on 
older, more traditional analogue technologies and 
engagement methods. For example, when the use 
of their mobile app was much lower than hoped 
for, they reverted to the proven approach of driving 
around the neighbourhood in a rented bus with a 
loudspeaker system. Using this approach, they were 
able to broadcast their call to action and achieve their 
objective of increasing citizen participation in local 
budgeting processes.
Case study 2: participatory school governance
Users and non-users of citizen participation 
technologies for school governance are the second case 
study. We looked at one central government initiative 
called eBEIS, and one civil society initiative, funded by 
Making All Voices Count, called Check My School.
eBEIS: The Philippines government was a founding 
member of the global Open Government Partnership 
and one of the first governments to make selected 
government datasets available (Government of the 
Philippines 2012). However, the Open Data Portal 
includes almost no information on schools.11 
Instead, the Department of Education publishes 
school data on its enhanced Basic Education 
Information System (eBEIS). This was originally 
intended to be a user-friendly and publicly accessible 
information resource for all those directly affected by 
school performance and school management (Gigler 
and Bailur 2014). However, early iterations of eBEIS 
were beset by technical problems, and the current 
version of eBEIS is password-protected and only 
available to authorised education managers.12 
Check My School: The Aquino government encouraged 
participatory community-monitoring initiatives. 
Check My School13 was one such initiative managed 
by ANSA-EAP in cooperation with the Department 
of Education. It builds on the previous success of 
citizen participation monitoring projects run by 
G-Watch, most notably Textbook Count.14 Check My 
School created a new space for citizen participation 
in school management by providing access to 
records about school resources (e.g. numbers of 
students, classrooms, books, school budget and 
test results) and making it possible for anyone to 
point out discrepancies. It uses citizen participation 
technologies and community dialogue processes 
to inform community members by providing them 
with data about school resources, and to involve 
them in the monitoring and verification of school 
management, as well as in collective problem-
solving of any identified issues to improve school 
performance. 
9 See: http://openbub.gov.ph
10 The baragay is the smallest unit of administrative governance in the Philippines and equates to a neighbourhood or village of 
50–100 families. There are 42,000 barangay in the Philippines.
11 See: www.gov.ph/data/search/field_topic/education-47/type/dataset?sort_by=changed
12 See: http://ebeis.deped.gov.ph/beis/#
13 See: www.checkmyschool.org
14 Textbook Count was a successful citizen monitoring project for school resources. It was initially run by the CSO G-Watch, but later 
incorporated within the Department of Education’s core functions.
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The original Check My School concept imagined 
community members directly inputting and accessing 
data via an interactive website. However, access 
problems caused ANSA-EAP to change their design 
to include the training of community infomediaries to 
speak with local school administrators and citizens, 
gather and input data on behalf of community members, 
and to feed back to them. A detailed review of the Check 
My School process can be found in the World Bank’s 
evaluation of the programme (Shkabatur 2014). 
Case study 3: participatory governance of 
extractive industries
Users and non-users of citizen participation 
technologies for transparency and accountability 
in extractive industries were our final case study. 
While most participatory governance work focuses 
on citizens holding various levels and departments of 
government to account, the member organisations 
of Bantay Kita, an association of CSOs working 
on participatory governance issues in extractive 
industries, focus on holding corporate mining 
companies and other extractive industries to account. 
The Philippines is the world’s largest producer of 
nickel and produces significant quantities of other 
minerals and precious metals, oil and gas; these 
account for more than 10% of Philippines’ exports 
and 6% of its gross domestic product (EITE nd). 
Under the Aquino administration, the Philippines 
government joined the global Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) and publishes annual 
reports disclosing the income received by government 
and indigenous leaders from extractive industry 
companies.15 EITI is used by the government as a 
space to invite some CSOs to participate in aspects 
of oversight and policy formation in relation to mining 
and other extractive activities. 
The Philippines has progressive environmental laws and 
participatory governance processes compared to many 
neighbouring countries. However, members of Bantay 
Kita point to a substantial gap between the spirit of the 
law and practice at the local level. While the constitution 
promotes participatory governance, and the mining and 
environmental law is in place, the will and capacity to 
implement these are often absent. There is evidence 
that bribery and corruption are systematically used to 
evade due process. Some Bantay Kita members are 
involved in activities intended to secure transparency 
and hold extractive industries and government to 
account for any failure to adhere to the legislation. 
We travelled to the outlying island province of 
Palawan to hold a focus group discussion with 
members of Bantay Kita, as well as visit members’ 
organisations representing the Batak indigenous 
people and the Palawan NGO Network. As the 
police have a track record of taking bribes and 
‘losing’ evidence; the Palawan NGO Network retains 
confiscated chainsaws and vehicles as evidence. Their 
compound contains confiscated boats, motorbikes, 
guns and machetes and a 20-foot ‘sculpture’ made 
from over 100 identical chainsaws.
Meanwhile, the Palawan NGO Network raises 
awareness in local communities of existing 
environmental laws and land rights, and trains 
organised communities to defend their land against 
illegal logging, mining and fishing by conducting 
lawful citizens’ arrests and securing the prosecution 
of environmental criminals. It uses global positioning 
systems (GPS) and geographic information systems 
(GIS) to document environmental crimes, taking geo-
tagged and time-stamped photographs from mobile 
phones which are uploaded to ArcGIS software. 
This provides legally admissible evidence for later 
court cases, verifying that offences took place in 
government-protected locations. 
These collective actions were designed to build the 
capacity of communities to safeguard their own land 
and environmental resources in accordance with the law. 
However, the majority of citizens that we met did not use 
citizen participation technologies, and provided evidence 
of the wide range of constraints that impede the use of 
technologies among marginalised communities.
4. Findings: access analysis
The following two sections present our research 
findings. We have highlighted the words of users 
and non-users of citizen participation technologies – 
these are shown as quotes throughout the text – and 
interpret them through the conceptual frameworks 
of access analysis (this section) and power analysis 
(Section 5). The next two sections present findings 
ordered around the framework of access analysis and 
power analysis. 
Given the Philippines’ history of early adoption and 
high levels of text messaging, social media use and 
the rapid expansion of smartphone ownership, we 
began this research expecting to find extensive use of 
citizen participation technologies. Our naiveté in this 
15 See: www.ph-eiti.org
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regard was challenged early in the research process. 
Interviewees and focus group participants made it 
clear that a more complex and dynamic reality exists, 
where differentiated levels of device and connectivity 
access act as barriers to citizen participation in digital 
governance initiatives. 
4.1 Availability 
Connectivity is uneven in the Philippines: 21.5% of 
the population are not covered by a 3G signal,16 for 
example.17 Being a nation of 7,000 islands presents 
a formidable network infrastructure challenge that 
acts as a major obstacle to digital inclusion: “If you 
speak about remote islands, 100% [of them] are off 
the grid.” 
For many Filipinos living on remote islands or in 
outlying rural areas, Internet access is simply 
not available. This is a formidable problem for 
development initiatives that aim to incorporate 
marginalised communities in civic life and inclusive 
governance activities. As one interviewee from a CSO 
commented, “Most of the communities that we work 
with are in far-flung places, so connectivity is an 
issue.” Only the main central islands have broadband 
cable Internet connections; many others have mobile 
phone connections, but hundreds of islands have no 
electricity connection. 
These networks do not exist in isolation from each 
other; electrical network outages often cause 
Internet connection failures. Even on islands that are 
connected, the connectivity footprint does not extend 
to all of the population and is often very fragile. “We 
have outages every day … How can a community 
access the [citizen participation] data if the 
infrastructure is so weak?” An example of this came 
about during our research. The Wi-Fi connectivity 
was generally good in the hotel in the Palawan’s 
provincial capital where we held the focus group 
discussions, but frequent power outages meant that 
the hotel often had to rely on a diesel generator as a 
back-up. Even this level of Internet availability was 
a luxury compared to the subsequent focus group 
discussions with the rural Batak indigenous people’s 
organisation. The Batak village had no connection to 
the electricity grid18 and we were told that getting a 
mobile signal often involved a long hike – across 11 
bridges – to the nearest main road. 
Availability issues are not by any means confined 
to the Batak people: “The data of the government 
says that almost half (between 40–50%) of the 
communities here in Palawan do not have access 
to electricity.” The lack of availability is a particular 
issue for indigenous peoples, the majority of whom 
are concentrated in the highlands, rural areas, and 
remote islands of the Philippines, where the level of 
all government service provision, as well as corporate 
connectivity infrastructure, is low. 
By contrast, those living or working in the urban 
metropolitan centres experience much greater 
Internet connectivity. There are, however, still 
availability issues. As women live disproportionately 
in rural areas and spend more time in the home 
or engaged in unpaid domestic work (PSA 2016), 
they have less availability than men. It is important 
to note that, in relation to the five A’s, we found a 
general deficit of gender-disaggregated data – a 
finding consistent with other research on technology 
in development (UNCTAD 2014). However, we 
established that although Filipina women are 
7% more likely than men to be registered mobile 
phone users, they are 3% less likely to be users of 
mobile data. The reasons for this are not clear, but 
may include affordability and awareness (further 
discussed later in this section). 
Overall, our field data produced a complex picture 
of fluid and fragile connectivities (de Lanerolle 
2017), especially among those living in marginalised 
communities. This contradicts the static, binary 
‘imaginary’ produced by official connectivity statistics, 
which characterise populations simply as either 
connected or disconnected. For the Filipinos that we 
spoke to, availability varies over space and time, as 
a person moves from their home to their workplace 
or from the village to the main road. Availability also 
fluctuates in unpredictable and intermittent ways: as 
the power supply cuts in and out, or as the cellular 
coverage fluctuates. 
As these examples make clear, even when a citizen 
lives in an area where the Internet is available, 
questions of reliability and quality remain. The 
Philippines has the slowest Internet connection 
speeds in the Asia Pacific region (Akamai 2017); as 
one of the Philippines’ foremost open government 
data professionals quipped, the very slow connection 
speeds available at his home meant that he has 
plenty of time to boil his rice while waiting for a 
dataset to download. 
Availability is clearly an effective barrier to online 
citizen participation in the Philippines. However, as the 
following sections will show, availability by itself does 
not lead to technology use; GSMA (2016) research 
estimates that of those Filipinos for whom mobile 
16 The third generation of wireless mobile telecommunications technology.
17 See: www.mobileconnectivityindex.com/#year=2016&zoneIsocode=PHL
18 Some homes have solar power as a result of a non-government project.
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broadband is available, 67% do not use it. The other 
four ‘A’s of technology access offer some reasons 
why.
4.2 Affordability 
This was the single most important reason for 
non-use of citizen participation technologies in 
our research. Even where connectivity is available, 
there exists a substantial subset of Filipinos who 
cannot afford smartphones or mobile internet data, 
predominantly those on modest or low incomes. As 
one expert put it when discussing the cost of mobile 
data connectivity, “A 3G signal is available but it is 
not affordable.”
This finding was reinforced in all five focus group 
discussions. Group members worked individually and 
then in pairs to identify the most common reasons 
for non-use, which they then clustered, discussed 
and ranked in importance. Affordability was ranked 
among the two most important factors by all of the 
focus groups. As one participant commented, 
“A phone that is 3G-ready is too expensive … and 
that is because we have a duopoly in the Philippines 
… We had a third entrant try to come in … but the 
duopoly blocked that.” 
There are two important points here. Firstly, 
although some mobile phones are affordable, 
smartphones can be very expensive. Secondly, a 
data connection fast enough to browse the Internet 
is too expensive for most. A GSMA survey (2016) 
showed that Filipinos in the top 20% income 
bracket would, on average, expect to spend 5% of 
their income on mobile ownership, while those in 
the bottom 40% would have to spend 29%. The 
World Economic Forum ranks the Philippines 107th 
out of 139 countries regarding affordability.19 This 
affects the way Filipinos use mobile phones; 95% of 
mobile phone subscriptions are prepaid; only 55% 
of subscribers use mobile broadband, of which 80% 
only have access to the lowest speed plans (1–3 
megabits per second). 
Our findings confirm that affordability is not a 
binary issue. As anticipated in Section 2, there 
is no neat division in the Philippines population 
between those who can afford smartphones and 
Internet connectivity, and those who cannot. What 
stood out in our findings was that there appear to 
be different classes of connectivity forming in the 
Philippines, which reflect existing socio-economic 
divisions. 
People on low incomes can often still afford 
to buy a basic feature phone, register a mobile 
phone number, and buy a ‘bundle’ that provides 
50 SMS messages – all for as little as US$10. At 
the other end of the spectrum, a new, top-end 
smartphone costs over US$1,000 and a post-paid 
monthly data and voice subscription can cost 
US$50 per month. For a nurse or a teacher, for 
example, that is unaffordable; it would equate 
to four months’ salary just to buy the phone20 
and another 20% of their monthly salary for 
connectivity.21 SMS-only connectivity is affordable 
to most (but not all) of the people that we met, 
but SMS connectivity is insufficient to engage with 
many of the citizen-engagement platforms that we 
reviewed, many of which require Internet access or 
smartphone apps. 
This tiered picture of classes of connectivity is 
supported by other data, which shows that only 46% 
of Filipinos use mobile phones to connect to the 
Internet, 26% only use their mobile phones for voice 
and text, and 28% do not use mobile phones at all 
(GSMA 2016).
Our analysis of access in Manila and Palawan leads 
us to the finding that different classes of user 
experience exist in the Philippines; Table 2 lists 
these. These are determined largely by affordability 
and may map onto income levels and socio-
economic class. This resonates with Qiu’s (2009) 
research with marginalised migrant workers in China 
and his concept of ‘working class technologies’. 
It also builds on other Making All Voices Count 
research by de Lanerolle (2017), which found 
that low and very low income South Africans 
experienced ‘fragile connectivity’ and had to adopt 
‘frugal practices’ to manage the limited connectivity 
that they could afford. Further research with larger 
samples and in other places will be necessary to 
test the veracity of this claim.
Table 2 is a schematic illustration of our findings in 
the Philippines, based on a modest amount of data 
and a limited sample. Despite this, we argue that 
this typology has value in illustrating a richer, more 
nuanced understanding of connectivities compared 
19 See: http://reports.weforum.org/global-information-technology-report-2016/networked-readiness-index/
20 See: www.payscale.com/research/PH/Job=Registered_Nurse_(RN)/Salary
21 See: https://shop.globe.com.ph/postpaid-plans
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to the dominant, binary understanding. Our research 
even identified further exceptions to the categories 
in Table 2: a manual worker, for example, may choose 
to forego other pleasures in order to set aside money 
to spend on an advanced phone or data credit. A 
second-hand market in imported or stolen phones 
is another means by which some people access a 
‘higher’ class of technology. Alternatively, even if a 
person has no job, she or he may have a phone gifted 
to them by a family member. 
Nevertheless, levels of technology access are 
largely related to socio-economic class and income 
levels. Conceptualising technology access in this 
differentiated way has the advantage of facilitating 
future research into the relationship between socio-
economic class and income levels to technology 
access. Such research could usefully consider other 
variables, such as age, gender and urbanity / rurality. 
This would inform increased understanding of the 
extent to which classes of citizens are in a position to 
take part in participatory governance initiatives, when 
such initiatives are predicated on a particular class of 
device ownership or connectivity access. 
Building on Qiu (2009) and de Lanerolle (2017), this 
conceptualisation of different classes of technology 
device ownership and connectivity access allows us to 
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Table 2 Classes of technology access in the Philippines
Class of 
technology 
access
Employment Device Connectivity Experience
Upper class  Independently 
wealthy or  
urban salaried 
professional 
Latest 
smartphone 
• Post-paid monthly 
mobile contracts 
with maximum 
gigabit / month 
data; unlimited 
calls and texts
• Wi-Fi at home and 
at work
• Connected by 
default to all the 
fastest available 
services 
• Uses Internet 
extensively
• Not frugal 
Middle class  Teacher,  
civil servant, 
shopkeeper
Previous 
generation of 
smartphone 
• Post-paid mid-
range monthly 
package of calls 
and text with 
limited data
• Wi-Fi at work and 
coffee shops, but 
not at home
• Always able to call 
and text
• Uses web mainly 
on Wi-Fi 
• Uses mobile data 
mainly for instant 
messaging
• Frugal with mobile 
data
Working class  Manual worker Feature phone 
with 
touchscreen 
and Internet 
capability
• Prepaid call credit
• Unlimited texts 
• Limited data
• No Wi-Fi access
• Text rather than 
voice calls
• Frugal with 
data (instant 
messaging only) 
• Internet limited to 
Facebook and free 
basics
Underclass  Unpaid work, 
unemployed, 
underemployed, 
informal work 
No phone or 
basic phone, 
with a non-
touchscreen 
and physical 
keyboard 
• Prepaid, but often 
has no credit
• Phone often not 
charged 
• No data
• No Wi-Fi access
• Unconnected by 
default
• Frugal with voice 
calls – mainly 
passive recipient 
of calls and texts
Source: Author’s own
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question the idea that the rapid pace of technological 
change leads to a progressive equalising of access 
and social equity. The popular notion of a meritocratic 
information revolution, in which the binary category 
of unconnected is rapidly disappearing, is not borne 
out by the evidence from this study. On the contrary, 
our evidence shows different classes of technology 
access forming. Although the capabilities of specific 
technologies improve over time – and the speed of 
connectivity increases – this is not translating into 
social equality or even into equality of connectivity. 
Indeed, these inequalities may be being amplified.
This is highly relevant because of the temptation by 
digital development designers to ‘future-proof’ citizen 
participation technologies by designing apps for the 
latest technology. The motivation to do so is often 
based on the flawed assumption that everyone will, 
sooner or later, have access to smartphones and to 
a level playing field of mobile Internet connectivity. 
While this argument undoubtedly has some logic, it 
ignores at least two facts. 
Firstly, levels of access to technology change over 
time, both for rich people and for poor people. Even 
if it were the case that, in the future, everyone will 
own a smartphone and be able to afford mobile data 
connectivity, by that time it is reasonable to assume 
that the richest consumers will have advanced to the 
next generation of digital technologies. The net effect 
of this would be that the relative divisions – between 
classes of technology access – endure over time. 
Secondly, in 2017 over 50% of the world’s 
population still does not have Internet access 
(UNCTAD 2017). Even in technologically and 
economically advanced countries such as the UK, 
as many as 10% still do not use it (ONS 2017). If 
this continues to hold true, then the implications 
for digital development are significant: citizen 
participation technologies that require relatively 
advanced levels of technology access will exclude 
those without that level of technology access. The 
result will be that those who are already privileged 
gain a further relative advantage. 
A further finding from our research was that for our 
participants, affordability was not simply about the 
purchase price of devices and connectivity; for some 
respondents, it was time (rather than money) that 
they could not afford to spend on citizen participation 
technologies. For this reason, it is important that 
applications were easy to use and could upload 
data quickly: “The cost and time is very real … Time 
is very important, because they could have been 
doing something else, earning money.” In addition 
to this calculation of the opportunity cost, one 
interviewee framed the calculation in terms of the 
return on investment, where the expected return was 
government responsiveness: “If citizens are engaging 
but government is not responding, why should they 
continue engaging?” 
From a gender perspective, the issue of time is 
particularly important, as research has established 
that women enjoy less free time than men due to the 
gendered burden of unpaid domestic work (Bardasi 
and Wodon 2006). This echoes findings from a Web 
Foundation report,22 which stated that lack of time was 
the single most important barrier preventing women 
from using the Internet more often. Lack of time was 
cited more often by women than men in our research, 
and more often by the poorest women than by other 
women. Further research is needed on these exclusions. 
4.3 Awareness 
Awareness levels can explain the non-use of citizen 
participation technologies where availability and 
affordability are not issues. Insufficient awareness of 
a particular technology, or of its relevance to the lives 
of potential users, can be crucial to uptake levels. As 
one research participant commented about Bottom-
up Budgeting, “They [citizens] are not aware of the 
programme.” 
It is ironic that initiatives that are focused on creating 
awareness of government data are often designed 
without sufficient thought or budget to create 
awareness of their own existence and relevance. As 
one respondent noted, awareness-raising should not 
be considered as a one-off event, but an ongoing 
process: “It’s never about a one-time event when you 
are speaking about Open Data. It has to figure within 
the awareness.” 
Our research showed that low levels of awareness of 
citizen participation technologies exist even among 
22 See: https://webfoundation.org/2016/04/closing-the-digital-divide-a-briefing-note
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the smartphone-owning technology experts and 
government officials that we interviewed in Manila. 
As one respondent pointed out, “Some of the chief 
executives of the local government units do not even 
know that they have an existing website in their 
municipality.” Our research also found low levels of 
awareness of other citizen participation technologies 
among tech-savvy urban governance activists. 
In the less tech-savvy rural Batak community, no 
one had heard of any of the citizen participation 
technology initiatives. None of our case studies 
had sufficient marketing budgets to raise levels of 
awareness, and there was agreement among the 
projects’ actors that it was far easier to attract short-
term funding for the technical development than to 
secure the medium- to long-term investment in the 
awareness-raising that is essential for successfully 
scaling initiatives beyond the pilot phase. 
In a GSMA survey (2016), 51% of offline Filipinos 
stated a lack of awareness of the usefulness of 
the Internet, and lack of locally relevant content,23 
as reasons for not getting online. These general 
levels of awareness remain a barrier to inclusive 
citizen participation, quite apart from the low 
levels of awareness of specific citizen participation 
technologies we identified in this research. In the 
GSMA survey, Filipino citizens reported experiencing 
four barriers to internet access: lack of awareness 
and locally relevant content (51%), lack of digital 
literacy and skills (27%), affordability (13%) and lack 
of network coverage (8%). Although this terminology 
differs slightly from ours, the survey provides some 
statistical support for our categories of awareness, 
abilities, affordability and availability. 
4.4 Abilities 
This can be a crucial barrier to the uptake of citizen 
participation technologies in places where the issues 
of availability, affordability and awareness have been 
addressed. As one member of the Batak community 
focus group said: “That [the Internet] is only for the 
educated ones; if you are not educated, you cannot 
use the computer.” 
There exists a significant sub-set of Filipinos who 
do not have sufficient digital literacy skills, or lack 
the self-confidence to learn these, to become 
independently active users of citizen participation 
technologies. The feeling of not being sufficiently well 
educated to use a computer speaks to the concept 
of ‘invisible power’ and internalised oppression 
(see Section 4.2), but in this section, we limit our 
discussion to the issues of users’ skills. 
Our research found that to enable the effective use 
of citizen participation technologies, there is a need 
for digital literacy training – not only in marginalised 
communities, but also in some CSOs and government 
departments: “Even among [CSOs], they really need 
to do information technology capacity-building.” 
Citizen participation technologies that aim to 
engage people from disadvantaged communities 
cannot presume the same levels of digital literacy 
that are found in relatively affluent areas. Although 
high-quality computer education is common in the 
country’s top schools and colleges, standards vary 
elsewhere. Educational resources such as classrooms, 
books and teachers are unevenly spread across the 
population, as are the resulting levels of educational 
attainment (Yamauchi and Parandekar 2014). 
Citizen participation technology initiatives therefore 
need to assess the abilities of their target users and 
incorporate training and capacity-building if these 
initiatives are to be truly inclusive. As one of our most 
experienced interviewees commented, “We see a lot 
of potential in citizens using technology to engage 
with government, but that of course will depend 
on citizens having access to technology, knowing 
how to use it, understanding and appreciating the 
information.” Citizen participation initiatives that aim 
at social inclusion will need to design for equity from 
the outset. 
4.5 Accessibility
Certain issues make it impossible for some citizens 
to participate in governance initiatives even when 
availability, affordability, awareness and abilities are 
not an issue. As noted in Section 2, we use the term 
‘accessibility’ to refer to technology modifications 
that are inclusive of citizens with disabilities, or whose 
literacy is in a regional or indigenous language: “At 
one of our [women’s] forums, we had a speaker who is 
visually impaired and she spoke about the difficulty.” 
For example, some digital technologies incorporate 
adaptations so that blind or visually impaired people 
can use them. In doing so, this opens up new 
employment and communication possibilities to these 
groups. However, these adaptive technologies are 
often only affordable to the most affluent citizens. 
Yet people living with disabilities tend to suffer from 
higher levels of unemployment and are more likely 
to live in poverty. To make it possible for blind or 
visually impaired citizens to use citizen participation 
technologies, designers will need to incorporate 
adaptive technologies that make their initiatives 
accessible to people with special needs – and make 
them affordable. 
23 In our five A’s classification, locally relevant content is a sub-component of accessibility.
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Limited language choices, in terms of the screen 
interfaces that applications use and Internet content 
overall, can present another accessibility barrier. Over 
50% of all information available on the World Wide 
Web is in English, a language in which around 60% of 
adult Filipinos are fluent.24 Many Filipinos also speak 
native languages, including Tagalog, Filipino, Cebuano 
and Hiligaynon, but each of these constitutes less than 
0.1% of all web content (w3techs 2017). This barrier 
is even more profound for indigenous communities. 
For instance, the language spoken by the Batak 
indigenous community was not available on any of the 
citizen participation technologies that we reviewed. 
Alternative languages could be incorporated into new 
versions of the software featured in our case studies. 
Furthermore, future citizen participation technology 
designers may wish to consider, at the outset, which 
communities their technologies are designed for and 
include language interface development and adaptive 
technologies in their overall development plans. 
It is worth noting, however, that communication 
barriers can be obstacles even when there is a 
shared language. As one participant pointed out, 
“Government has its own language and citizens have 
their own language. There is a disconnect … when 
we speak about technology, it’s not just about the 
hardware, it’s also about the interface – whether it is 
understandable or not.” 
4.6 Assessing the five A’s 
framework
In concluding this section, we can say that the five 
A’s were functional in providing a framework to 
help us to think through the complex and nuanced 
forms of access experienced by the users and non-
users of citizen participation technologies. Far from 
reproducing the binary categories of (entirely) 
connected or (entirely) unconnected, our research 
revealed a complex picture of access which is dynamic, 
fluid and fragile over time and space. The five A’s 
framework helped us to de-centre the technology in 
our analysis and highlight the ways in which different 
levels of citizen access to digital devices, and different 
levels of connectivity, reflect and are structured by 
existing socio-economic class divisions. 
As discussed, our analysis suggests that existing 
inequalities in class, gender and ethnicity are being 
reproduced as unequal access to digital devices 
and Internet connectivity. As more aspects of social 
and economic life move online, these inequalities of 
technology access represent new forms of exclusion. 
We have to conclude, therefore, that the ability of 
Filipino citizens to participate in technology-mediated 
citizen governance initiatives is being structured 
unequally, and along familiar dimensions of gender, 
ethnicity and class.
5. Findings: power analysis
After using the five A’s framework to analyse patterns 
of exclusion in the use and non-use of citizen 
participation technologies, our analysis then used the 
Power Cube framework (see Figure 2) to answer the 
research question of which forms of power, operating 
at which levels, and in which spaces, affect the use 
and non-use of citizen participation technologies.
5.1 Visible power
The Philippines is a signatory to many international 
conventions and was a founder member of the 
Open Governance Partnership. But as one research 
participant, who leads an organisation that uses 
citizen participation technologies, commented, 
“We are signatories to so many international treaties, 
and we have good legislation … but that is just one 
side of the story. The best measure of whether a 
policy is good or not is whether it is implemented or 
whether people really benefit: in terms of compliance 
it is just a token.” 
This point – that signing conventions and passing 
progressive legislation is only one factor contributing 
toward inclusive governance – was echoed by others. 
For example, the distinction between good policy 
24 See: www.ef.co.uk/epi
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and good practice was reinforced by one of the 
participants in the extractives focus group: “When 
we speak about visible spaces, our mining policies 
are actually very progressive. In every stage of 
monitoring, there is always civil society engagement, 
there is always community monitoring, there is 
multi-stakeholder oversight communities everywhere 
– but when you look deeper, there are ways that 
government and companies play around these 
policies.” 
The CSOs that we spoke to in the Philippines were 
not primarily concerned with the level of enabling 
legislation, however. In this regard, their situation is 
more advanced than other southeast Asian countries. 
For example, several research participants spoke 
with some pride about the Freedom Constitution of 
1987: “[It] is a special constitution because it came 
out of the dictatorship. It was a constitution that was 
developed with real participation from all sectors, so 
that is why it’s quite strong around participation.” 
However, as noted, the practice of participation 
does not always reflect the spirit of constitutional 
guarantees. The absence of a freedom of 
information (FOI) law25 was repeatedly mentioned 
during one focus group as hindering citizen 
access to government data, and transparency and 
accountability more generally. As one participant 
stated, “The absence of an FOI … keeps the masses 
ignorant and does not allow them to engage … 
The fact that we don’t have an FOI is a reminder to 
the public that you don’t have the right; that the 
government can tell you if it feels you should know.” 
The participant went on to describe how the current 
formal processes of demanding information can be 
discriminatory and / or make it difficult to remain 
anonymous: “[Identification is] required to access 
information, unlike in the US, where you can say you 
are Mickey Mouse and not give a reason.” 
According to Filipinos consulted during this research, 
the lack of a statutory freedom of information law 
remains a barrier to citizen participation, as people 
experience discrimination and fear a government 
record of who has asked for what information. 
5.2 Hidden power
Despite the presence of ‘front stage’ policies that 
actively promote open governance and citizen 
participation, our interviewees and focus groups 
members had personal experience of ‘back stage’ 
practices that effectively limited this participation. 
One civil society leader commented that “local 
government officials are wary of participation. As 
much as possible, they would like to take control of 
decisions because … they have self-interests, they 
will be held accountable. They cannot hide … if you 
open to transparent processes, you expose yourself 
to people taking power from you.” It was the view of 
this interviewee that the government officials he had 
interacted with had reasons to hide the processes 
by which they used their power to secure their 
own interests. The hidden power mechanisms that 
participants had experienced were wide-ranging, 
from the relatively mundane use of bureaucracy 
and personal relationships to aggressive nuisance 
lawsuits, bribery, intimidation and murder. 
“It’s who you know and how you know them that 
facilitates the getting of information, and sadly 
it is easier to get something if you say you are 
part of an organisation than if you are just [an 
individual].” Despite President Duterte’s executive 
order establishing that Filipinos have a right to 
information, and the 2017 launch of an electronic 
freedom of information website,26 several research 
participants cited personal experience where having 
existing relationships within government officers 
was a more effective means of access than following 
official process. One civil society leader explained 
that “because we have connections, we do get that 
information, through the EITI, because we sit in 
the multi-stakeholder group. [However] there is 
information that we want but cannot get, such as 
the auxiliary rights given to mining companies to 
divert water resources from the community to their 
operations … their right to cut down trees … these 
we don’t have access to.” 
These examples show that social capital often 
remains a more reliable means to ‘open’ government 
data than some open government transparency 
initiatives. It also shows that some transparency 
organisations use their own political capital to gain 
preferential access to information and influence, as 
well as the finite limits of that access. Moreover, it 
shows that ‘open’ data is not a binary concept; our 
research suggests that some data is open to some 
people, and that significant power remains with the 
Philippines government to deny citizen access. 
Our research in Palawan provided evidence of 
systematic bribery to secure political and corporate 
outcomes: “Vote-buying here is really, really strong. 
How can we expect people to be vigilant against those 
politicians when they are already bought? In the 
Philippines, every time there is an election, there ha[s] 
25 Although President Duterte made an executive order with regard to freedom of information, there are 161 exceptions allowed and, 
unlike a law, an executive order can be revoked without notice or due process.
26 See: www.foi.gov.ph
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been buying stations here and long lines for those 
stations.” 
This electoral vote-buying was also evidently 
complemented by bribery in corporate governance; 
according to one civil society activist, “I ran for 
officer of [an organisation]. This one government 
official heard I was running and sent someone [who] 
gave me this big envelope, and I could sense that it 
was money … he told me, ‘It’s loyalty from you he 
wants, and a guarantee.’” The same activist reported 
another, unrelated incident: “One of the officials of 
a mining company spoke to me three times … his 
message was just asking me what they can give me 
to mellow down my positions against their violations 
… he was just asking me how much do I need just to 
tone down more … officials already understand each 
other in terms of money … So that is the sad truth of 
why CSOs are unable to lobby for good governance – 
because you have this hidden agenda.” 
What these incidents show is that although the visible 
processes of political and corporate governance in 
the Philippines are, in some senses, exemplary, there 
is often a significant disconnect between policy and 
practice. Vested interests are able to mobilise hidden 
power to reproduce their power over others. 
We also found a pattern of intimidation and violence 
used to secure vested interests: “The governor here 
is something of a dictator … He’s scared everyone, 
including the mayors. He is rich and can file cases 
against them and can make charges. He controls the 
military. He is related to the president.”27 This quote 
is significant in the types of power it highlights; by 
this account, the governor has political, military and 
financial power and uses his wealth to abuse legal 
power. Rather than being earned through merit, these 
powers were acquired through familial relationships 
with the president. This lack of independence among 
government officials was echoed by one research 
participant who commented that “the point where 
civil service is a meritocracy, we are not there yet, 
we haven’t reached that point”. The use of money 
to launch nuisance lawsuits was also mentioned by 
a focus group participant: “It’s difficult to oppose 
mining … [indigenous farmers] don’t like mining 
because it depletes the watershed … but money 
really talks … He has been threatened in 13 cases 
with harassment lawsuits … and when the local 
government is pro mining, it’s even more difficult for 
the indigenous people’s communities.” 
When bribery and lawsuits are insufficient incentives, 
violence is frequently deployed to secure vested 
interests, according to some research respondents: 
“We already have communities that have been 
killed, shot. We have cases against the killers.” 
Several interviewees confirmed that not only was 
fear widespread, but that those who stood up 
against mining companies were regularly killed. 
Global Witness (2017) research confirms that the 
Philippines is the most dangerous place in Asia to 
be an environmental activist, with 28 documented 
murders in 2016 alone. The Global Witness report 
also confirms that aggressive lawsuit attacks, 
intimidation and violence are widespread in the 
Philippines, particularly in Palawan, where most 
deaths are linked to mining and where the majority 
of those killed are indigenous peoples. In relation 
to the Philippines, one of the report’s main findings 
points to the disconnect between the terrain of visible 
power and hidden power when it concludes that 
“the government’s regulatory rhetoric on mining is 
contradicted by a discourse threatening defenders” 
(Ibid: 31). 
Hidden power also manifests itself in the ability to 
shape the agenda of what gets discussed and what 
gets resolved (VeneKlasen and Miller 2002). One 
interviewee said that despite formal processes (visible 
power) that entitled his organisation to a seat at 
a table representing a vulnerable constituency, in 
practice they were only able to push forward changes 
on minor issues and lacked the ability to influence 
more strategic issues: “In the committee there are 
seven members, and we are just one of them. So, 
whenever we raise issues critical to government or 
[big businesses], then it goes down to voting and we 
get outnumbered. So, although we are very active and 
have some influence, when it comes to critical issues, 
we are less influential. We can mobilise people and 
resources, but regarding critical issues, we don’t have 
power.” The presence of this oversight committee 
creates an appearance of participation, but without 
the power to effect change. 
5.3 Invisible power
If hidden power enables government to deny people 
a seat at the table, then invisible power means that 
even for those granted a seat, developing the self-
efficacy to use power comes more slowly. Invisible 
power shapes people’s sense of themselves, what 
they feel that they deserve, what they feel that they 
are capable of, and what they believe to be true. 
“We are the small people” was how one indigenous 
Batak leader explained the self-image of many of 
her neighbours, as a way of explaining their non-
27 At the time of our fieldwork, President Duterte had begun his election commitment to give the police impunity to kill low-level 
drug dealers and addicts without the need for recourse to any judicial system. This has resulted in several thousand extrajudicial 
killings and summary executions by police and vigilante death squads.
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engagement in formal governance issues. As a result 
of socialisation, culture and ideology, some people 
feel that their opinions and participation are of little 
value, and defer to others to make decisions about 
what is best for them. When it came to coding our 
field data, there was more evidence related to invisible 
power than any other category – and the most 
significant and unexpected code that emerged was 
the word ‘fear’. 
The different kinds of fear mentioned ranged widely. 
One participant described how his community 
chooses not to engage in governance for fear of being 
marked out for special attention: “There may be the 
possibility that you get branded as a supporting a 
politician … even if you support a politician, that 
should not be carried after the election, but the reality 
is … you get branded and that affects your access.” 
This fear was learned over time and internalised. 
The interviewee told us how they were hospitalised 
and asked a politician for assistance, but did not 
receive it because they had previously helped another 
politician. Another interviewee reiterated this point: 
“That is quite common in the Philippines – party 
affiliation affects access.” 
Research participants also feared repercussions 
for family members if they engaged in governance 
issues: “Their relative works in the mining company. 
So, they cannot speak out because if they do, their 
relative may lose their job or scholarship. I always 
hear [things like]: ‘I am afraid my son or daughter 
who is employed will be removed.’” This is as true for 
powerful mining companies as it is in schools. Check 
My School told us that rural mothers often “find it 
risky to be involved in our work because they fear the 
principal might target their child”. 
Persistent experience of intimidation and 
powerlessness can be internalised as a feeling that 
a person’s opinions are not valued or worthy of 
consideration. According to one research respondent, 
Filipinos are “not necessarily blunt or forthright 
when it comes to speech. Especially when speaking 
to authoritative personalities – those that have some 
kind of power status. The whole submissiveness is 
there. Perhaps it is a post-colonial thing.” The idea 
that acceptance of power difference can be explained 
as a national cultural characteristic has been 
systematically challenged as culturally deterministic 
(Ailon 2008; McSweeney 2002; Hofstede 1984). 
What we can say is that submissiveness is 
necessarily a relational concept, in that subordination 
requires something or somebody else to be 
dominant. The interviewee’s reference to “those 
that have some kind of power status” indicates 
that those being submissive have learned a (social 
norm of) deference to members of another group 
with a (socially constructed) higher status, justified 
on the basis of age, education, gender, ethnicity 
or class. One interviewee explained some people’s 
reluctance to challenge officials by saying, “I think 
it’s the class status: you are just a citizen, you are 
not an official, you’re not a government employee. 
You know, specifically the poor people, they have 
low self-esteem.” As one of the citizen participatory 
technology developers commented in her interview, 
in relation to those that have been persistently 
deprived and unheard, “The idea is that their opinion 
doesn’t count because it never has, especially if they 
are poor.”
An internalised sense of low self-worth was a 
recurring theme among our interviewees. One 
interviewee explained how community members 
approached to engage in a participatory monitoring 
project would commonly ask questions like: “Who 
am I to be monitoring these projects? I am not an 
engineer, I’m not a professional, I am just an ordinary 
citizen.” Marginalised groups are susceptible to not 
only internalising a low sense of self-worth, but 
also internalising the idea that they are worth even 
less than the ‘ordinary citizens’. One indigenous 
interviewee expressed this point when saying, 
“Especially since we are small people, it would be very 
easy to disregard us.” 
This learned sense of low self-worth and low self-
efficacy was raised by several interviewees as a 
significant obstacle to securing citizen participation: 
“This is the problem with getting people to step and 
engage, because of the culture of ‘Why bother?’ and 
that ‘It’s beyond me’ is already very much engrained.” 
People may also internalise the idea that they are 
ignorant and have nothing intelligent to offer, “So that 
assertiveness that we were hoping for wasn’t there. 
We were able to provide them with access to the data 
and eventually the resources, but even that is not 
enough to empower them.” 
We also found evidence that contextual social norms 
and power relations prevent marginalised people 
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from taking full advantage of citizen participation 
technologies – even when the technology and data 
are provided out of project funds. Our research 
participants discovered, for example, that providing 
disadvantaged people with access to data, or giving 
them phones, was insufficient for achieving their 
participation in governance. From this, we conclude 
that digital governance interventions need to go 
beyond technical access and assess the social and 
political factors that limit citizen participation. In 
other words, in order to be fully successful, projects 
should consider the inhibitive effects of hidden and 
invisible power on citizen participation. The director 
of one of the more successful projects in our case 
studies had learnt lessons from early failures, and 
incorporated analogue components alongside their 
digital designs: “The reason that we have [this] 
blended approach – online and offline – it’s because 
empowerment cannot be encapsulated in technology! 
It’s more dynamic that that. You need face-to-face 
human interaction for that.”
5.4 Levels of power: global, 
national and local 
The forms of power discussed in Sections 5.1 to 5.3 can 
take places at one or more level. Nominally, the Power 
Cube has three levels of power – global, national and 
local – but in reality, the actual number of levels varies 
from case to case. In our research, the relevant levels 
of local governance included province, municipality and 
barangay, as well as levels within the decision-making 
structures in indigenous people’s organisations’ that 
feed into the barangay and municipality levels. 
Global power
For interviewees working on open government data, 
their membership of global bodies such as the Open 
Governance Partnership were valued sources of 
strength and expertise: “We work with Publish What 
You Pay because they are our international coalition.” 
In the extractive focus group, reference was made to 
the leverage gained through membership of EITI. One 
interviewee using citizen participation technologies 
for disaster risk reduction reported that “the global 
level has been effective at bringing issues of the 
Philippines to international debates. For example, 
the [United Nations] Conference on Climate Change 
… really brought out ... disaster preparedness and 
disaster risk reduction.” 
The challenge, however, has been the disconnect 
between the global level and local levels. As one 
of the mining activists commented, “It was really 
interesting, because a few weeks ago, when we were 
working with communities, we asked ‘do you know 
EITI?’ and all of them had never heard of it and they 
had never heard of the [mining] companies paying 
US$3 million over three years to their local chiefs.” 
Despite the potential for global open data initiatives 
to inform local communities about what mining 
companies are paying local leaders for their consent, 
the current reality is that the individuals engaged at 
the global level are rarely from the most marginalised 
groups. It remains a challenge to connect global and 
local practices meaningfully.
National power
At the national level, the Philippines’ constitution 
promotes participation, and the Aquino government 
introduced legislation and regulations that mandate 
citizens’ representation on a raft of monitoring and 
oversight committees, and forced the issue through 
processes such as Bottom-up Budgeting (see Section 
3.2). This is an example of the use of hidden power 
operating at the municipal level to frustrate global 
conventions, constitutional guarantees and legislative 
intent. It also illustrates how any of the forms of 
power from the Power Cube can play out at any of the 
levels of power. 
In the extractives focus group, there was frustration 
that global conventions and national policy rhetoric 
stood in stark contrast to local practices: “At the 
national level, we get to raise our issues but at the 
local level, when people raise their issues, they get 
killed, they get harassed by local politicians and 
by mining companies themselves, so participation 
becomes difficult at the local level.”
It was in this context of violence that one provincial 
organisation had taken to using digital photographic 
evidence from local community activists, which were 
geo-tagged and time-stamped and then uploaded 
to GIS software to provide admissible evidence that 
extractive industries were breaking the law. “You 
can convince government if you have technology 
and you have evidence. We have a special law 
that bans extractive activities in natural forests … 
before, because you didn’t have geo-tagged and 
photographical evidence, the politicians wouldn’t 
believe you.” 
Indigenous people’s use of digital evidence, 
embedded in geo-spatial technology, helps them to 
elevate the status of their legal testimony in ways 
that substantially improve their ability to defend their 
communal lands from illegal mining, logging and 
fishing. What was interesting about this successful 
application of citizen participation technologies was 
that the organisation responsible was clear that their 
ability to scale the work was not an issue of access 
to more (digital) technology, but rather the ability 
to expand their (analogue) capacity-building with 
local communities regarding national environmental 
law and their rights to protect their territory against 
illegal encroachment and environmental crime. 
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Local power
Local power is structured at three main levels of 
government in the Philippines: province, municipality 
and barangay. Historically, indigenous people were 
under-represented at all levels as they were not 
recognised as citizens in the Philippines. There is now 
special provision for the tribal councils of indigenous 
people to represent their concerns at the barangay or 
municipal level: “The chief would go to the barangay 
captain. They bring up their issues at the barangay 
and, if it is needed, they go to the city … They are 
involved with the barangay council as the minority 
representative.” 
Similarly, prior to 1987, CSOs were not represented 
in local or corporate governance, but now they are 
required to be representative. However, the spirit 
of this law is often not adhered to. An interviewee 
told us that “in municipal government council law, 
it says at least 25% should come from CSOs, but 
in the monitoring team there is only one out of 
15 people … we are able to get our issues on the 
agenda, but whether or not it is acted upon varies. 
There are issues that are easily addressed, but more 
fundamental and strategic issues are not addressed.” 
Again, the evidence from our research suggests that 
hidden power is deployed to subvert the regulatory 
requirement for specified levels of participation. 
This interviewee also claimed that while there is 
some flexibility around less important issues, for 
fundamental and strategic issues citizen and civil 
society concerns are not influential at the local level. 
Some of the local citizen participation initiatives 
in our research noted a tension between wanting 
active support from national government at the 
same time as wanting to avoid being slowed down by 
government bureaucracy or co-opted by government 
and watered down. One official from eBEIS expressed 
this clearly: “We are more or less operating 
independently and that has its good and bad sides. 
The good side is that we can really determine the 
course of our own project. The bad side is that there 
is low appreciation on the side of the Department 
of Education … If we were [more integrated into 
government], you would get more rules, you would 
get more guidelines to the point where it becomes 
part of the bureaucracy and gets watered down. 
That’s what happened to Textbook Count.” 
On the other hand, local initiatives often need 
engagement from the national government if their 
objectives are to have a widespread effect: “That’s 
the difficult part, because if we would like to push 
for a reform within the government structure, that 
cannot happen at the local level alone. It should have 
some national support. In the same manner, national 
movements should be supported by grounded 
activities. If the movement is confined in some 
location, then you might be successful in the localised 
advocacy work – but influencing national decision-
making [is impossible].” 
One strategy to address this paradox is to join civil 
society networks. This enables an initiative to retain 
a local focus but partner with others to engage with 
government at other levels (global, national, local), 
while at the same time working horizontally with other 
CSOs in the media, academia and faith-based groups: 
“Joining a network so that [a] recommendation can 
have greater weight … when nothing happens with 
the formal structure, the network brings the case to 
the media, sometimes to Facebook, sometimes to 
someone in higher authority.”
5.5. Spaces of power: closed, 
invited and claimed 
Most citizen participation initiatives – and hence 
citizen participation technologies – target closed 
spaces of power and aim to create more invited 
or claimed spaces as a way to create more open, 
transparent and accountable forms of governance. 
The extractive industries in the Philippines are a case 
in point. 
The process by which global mining corporations 
secured rights from the national government to clear 
forests, divert water courses and strip-mine the land 
were almost entirely closed to the local indigenous 
people who inhabited and farmed the land. Bantay 
Kita is the national association of CSOs working 
on extractive issues in the Philippines. Bantay Kita 
member organisations work in invited and claimed 
spaces to open up government and corporate 
decision-making on extractive issues. They do so 
at global, national and local levels. Through their 
membership of the global EITI initiative, Bantay 
Kita has successfully obtained access to open data 
records that extractive industries are now required 
to submit as part of global agreements. The Aquino 
government created a range of invited spaces in 
which some CSOs were given limited places on a 
range of decision-making, monitoring and oversight 
committees. Meanwhile, at the local level, CSOs like 
the Palawan NGO Network have been successful in 
creating new claimed spaces of legal accountability, 
by organising citizens’ arrests and prosecutions. 
The boundaries between these categories can be 
contested, as it could be argued that invited spaces 
arise as a function of civil society claims, but they are 
conceptually valuable nonetheless. 
In understanding how change happens, the question 
arises as to whether it matters if a new space for 
participation is created by government (invited) or 
by citizens (claimed). Different opinions were offered 
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by participants that we interviewed. The head of 
one CSO argued that “citizen engagement is more 
likely to be successful if it is initiated by CSOs rather 
than by individuals, because CSOs have a history of 
engaging with the government”. Another education 
activist opined that “if government initiates, it has 
the authority and the resources of government, so 
you have an advantage”. For this reason, they formed 
close constructive relationships with government 
departments. This opinion was echoed by an activist 
from the mining sector: “There is more traction when 
events are called by national government … one of 
the [our] advantages … is that we get to engage with 
governments.” 
One international expert that we interviewed made 
the case that “it matters who initiates [because] 
Filipinos are relational … there is very high regard 
for working with someone who has been vetted by 
other people that you have worked with before”. 
From her perspective, it is not so much whether the 
person initiating is from the government or a CSO, 
but whether they have earned the trust of citizens 
based on past performance – and whether others will 
therefore join the initiative.
Several research participants made a strong case 
that what mattered most was whether the process 
increased the political agency of citizens: “We need 
to clarify the difference between disclosure and 
access [to government data].” This participatory 
governance activist argued that there is a significant 
difference between a government opening datasets 
that it wishes to publicise, and a citizen feeling able 
to demand access to any data that they wished to 
see: “Government disclosing data does not take the 
place of arming citizens with the tools to access 
what they want to access, because opening data is 
the call of the government – but wanting data is the 
call of citizens, the ability to ask further rather than 
just having access to what is disclosed. That is more 
telling about whether you are really empowered and 
whether the government is really open.” 
This last point is crucial. If the objective is for 
government to be transparent and accountable 
to citizens, then citizen participation technologies 
need to enable citizens to access the information of 
their choosing; information which reflects citizens’ 
priorities. If the objective is to empower citizens, then 
moving from the internalisation of powerlessness (a 
sense of feeling unheard and unentitled) to a sense of 
empowerment sufficient to request information and, 
with others, to influence government, is potentially 
transformative. What matters in assessing the 
transformative potential of such initiatives is the 
extent to which they enable previously marginalised 
people to claim citizenship and effect changes over 
decisions relevant to their own lives and interests 
(Gaventa 2005).
6. Conclusions
This research analysed a range of citizen participation 
technology initiatives in the areas of participatory 
budgeting, school monitoring and extractive industry 
governance. The purpose was not to evaluate the 
initiatives themselves, but rather to understand which 
factors affect exclusion and non-use. To avoid the 
techno-centric gaze, case studies were formed not 
around specific citizen participation technologies, but 
rather around groups of users and non-users in the 
three focus areas. 
Focus groups and interviews produced new 
knowledge about different classes of technology 
ownership and citizens’ often fragile and fluid 
connectivity experiences, especially among 
marginalised communities. This contradicts the binary 
and static view of (entirely) connected or (entirely) 
unconnected people, as represented in official 
statistics. 
The five A’s of technology access served as a useful 
framework for thinking through the complex levels 
of technology access and exclusion experienced by 
research participants in the Philippines. This also 
proved useful as a way to de-centre the technology 
itself and identify a wide range of technical, social and 
political factors that structure those exclusions. Our 
analysis suggests that, for this research sample, pre-
existing structural inequalities of class, gender and 
ethnicity are being reproduced in unequal classes of 
technology ownership and connectivity access. Those 
with the lowest class of connectivity and technology 
ownership were unable to take part in technology-
mediated governance initiatives. Those with the most 
privileged access to technology gain yet further social 
and political advantage by having their voices heard in 
any technology-mediated ‘participatory’ governance 
initiatives. 
To this extent, it is evident that unequal classes of 
technology access (re)produce pre-existing social 
inequalities. Further research is necessary to test 
these findings with larger sample sizes and in different 
geographies, as well as in relation to the intersection 
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of class with other dimensions of inequality, including 
gender, ethnicity, age and disability. 
The power analysis we conducted as part of this 
research found that the provision of technology 
alone (in the form of free phones or mobile apps to 
target groups) was an insufficient condition of citizen 
participation. The evidence presented suggests that 
forms of hidden and invisible power can explain 
non-use and the consequent failure of some digital 
development projects to meet their objectives. 
These findings point to a need to modify the theory 
of change that underlies many citizen participation 
technology initiatives, and digital development efforts 
more widely. To enhance citizen participation in 
governance, it is necessary to do more than provide 
the correctly specified technology. In terms of 
technology access, our case studies demonstrated 
that, in addition to addressing availability and 
affordability, successful projects also need to tackle 
levels of awareness, abilities and accessibility to 
ensure citizens are able to make effective use of 
participation technologies. In terms of power, the 
case studies illustrated that when people have been 
systematically marginalised or persistently deprived, 
we must not discount the possibility that internalised 
oppression may self-limit levels of engagement. 
As a result, digital development projects that aim to 
secure the participation of disadvantaged groups 
may need to include activities that enhance the self-
efficacy and political consciousness of marginalised 
groups in order to be genuinely inclusive. Such 
processes should be designed to bring people outside 
of the decision-making process into it and lead people 
to perceive themselves as able and entitled to make 
decisions.
Technology is not neutral; it often reflects and 
reproduces dominant social relations. The ability of 
Filipino citizens to actively participate in technology-
mediated governance is being structured along 
recognisable lines of ethnicity, class and gender. As 
long as social and economic inequalities endure in 
the Philippines, there is good reason to expect them 
to continue to be reflected materially in inequitable 
technology access and subjectively in people’s 
internalised sense of privilege or powerlessness. 
For those concerned with digital development, the 
question therefore becomes: which classes of users 
are their citizen participation technologies intended 
for, and how can they ensure inclusive and equitable 
participation? 
Our research leads us to make three 
recommendations to designers of digital development 
initiatives who wish to be inclusive of marginalised 
and excluded citizens: 
1. Prior to implementation, obtain, through 
access analysis, a clear understanding of which 
technologies and levels of connectivity are 
available and affordable to marginalised and 
excluded groups
2. Through power analysis, obtain a detailed 
understanding of which forms of (hidden 
and invisible) power need to be addressed in 
programme design.
3. Based on that analysis, design for equity by building 
awareness, ability and accessibility components 
into the implementation of projects, as well as 
countering the effects of hidden and invisible 
power by including elements that raise awareness 
of governance issues and enhance the political 
agency of those previously marginalised and 
excluded. 
By seeing beyond the techno-centric gaze and 
incorporating these social and political considerations 
into their theories of change, future digital 
development initiatives can improve both their levels 
of inclusion and their overall efficacy.
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